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Bruce Riedel: Al Qaeda’s Arab Comeback

Al Qaeda’s success in capitalizing on revolutionary change in the Arab world comes despite a lack of broad popular support. It remains a extreme movement that appeals only to a small minority, but terrorism is not a popularity contest. Al Qaeda today is stronger at the operational level in the Arab world than it has been in years, and its prospects for getting even stronger are rich.

„Von Kerbala nach Jerusalem“

„Von Kerbala nach Jerusalem“: Diese berühmte Propagandaaussage der iranischen Führung während des iranisch-irakischen Krieges in den 80er Jahren stellte Jonathan Weckerle an den Anfang seines Vortrags über den Iran am 17. Juli im Jugendkulturzentrum Forum in Mannheim. Denn sie zeige beispielhaft, dass die antiisraelische Haltung des heutigen iranischen Führung eine lange Vorgeschichte habe, erläuterte der Referent seinen zahlreichen Zuhörern.

Neue Video-Kurzinterviews: Drei Fragen zum Iran für Wahied Wahdat-Hagh und Michael Rubin

Behind the International Terrorism Campaign of Hizbollah and Iran

The challenge facing the Israeli intelligence community is identifying whether the combined terrorist campaign abroad is meant to signal Israel that Iran will not tolerate Israeli aggression towards it, and that harming Israeli targets abroad will end only when Israel also ends its activities against Iran and Hizbollah, or whether Iran’s considerations are broader. It may be that Iran is determined to draw Israel into a harsh reaction against Hizbollah in Lebanon in response to terrorist attacks abroad. This could drag Israel into an all-out war in Lebanon, which would take a heavy toll on Hizbollah but also on Israel and divert it from preparations for what is seen in Tehran as Israel’s immediate intention to attack Iran, and perhaps even intended to divert attention away from what is happening the backyard of its ally, Syria.

Moment of Truth Approaching in Damascus

Syria today is actually under the Assad regime’s military occupation, and it is being gradually removed by the Free Syrian Army. Assad will have to decide very soon whether to keep his dwindling forces broadly deployed or concentrate them in the main battle centers and the Alawite areas so as to protect the Alawites against vengeance and massacres. In light of the developments, especially the rebels’ gains in recent months, it appears that the battle for Syria has entered its final phase and Assad’s regime will not be around much longer.

Egypt and Iran: Will the Two Walk Together?

It is also doubtful whether Egypt is prepared to pay the price of thawing relations with Iran, not only vis-à-vis the Gulf states but also the United States and the West in general, all of which would view such a move negatively. Iran and Egypt might renew diplomatic relations, if only to distinguish the current Egyptian regime from that of Mubarak, and as part of a new Egyptian, post-revolutionary foreign policy to maintain correct relations with all its neighbors. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Egypt will pursue warm relations with Iran. Such a move is liable to isolate Egypt in the Arab world and globally, damage its primary status in the region and its interests in the Gulf, and deny it critical financial assistance. It is more reasonable to assume that Egypt will understand, as Turkey did after the Arab Spring began, that it must take a side, and that the side that is more natural to it is the side of those who oppose and compete with Iran.

Michael Lüders und "die reichen New Yorker Juden"

Lüders ist nicht nur Sachbuchautor, sondern schreibt auch Romane, wie seine Homepage verrät. In seinem Buch „Der falsche Krieg“ sind beide Genres vermischt: Was auf den ersten Blick wie ein profunder historischer Abriss erscheint, hält einer Quellenprüfung nicht stand. Bei Lüders sind nicht nur Fiktionen und Fakten sondern auch Berufsinteressen und „Expertisen“ vermixt. Ihn als „Nahostexporten“ vorzustellen, ohne seine Berufstätigkeit als Nahost-Wirtschaftslobbyist zu erwähnen, kommt einem Etikettenschwindel gleich. Das ist, als würde man einen Sheikh Ali Reza Attar als „Iranexperten“ in die Fernsehstudios einladen, ohne zu erwähnen, dass er von Beruf der Botschafter Irans in Deutschland ist.

Palestinians' Islamist Spring

Unfortunately, the young men and women who are leading the anti-Palestinian Authority campaign in the West Bank do not represent the majority. That is why a Palestinian Spring could quickly turn into an Islamist Spring, paving the way for Hamas to seize control over the West Bank. The only way this outcome might possibly be avoided is if International community immediately demands reforms from Abbas: the end to corruption, and the end to repression of free speech.

“Ahmed, Ahmed, warum baust du eine Bombe?”

Mit viel Witz und klaren Worten hat der israelische Sicherheitsexperte Dan Schueftan seine Einschätzungen zur Lage im Nahen und Mittleren Osten gegeben. Er zeichnet ein düsteres Bild der Realität und kann über die Dialogbemühungen der Europäer nur den Kopf schütteln. Der einzige Grund, weswegen Israel heute noch existiere, sei die Ansgt der umliegenden arabischen Staaten vor der militärischen Schlagkraft des Landes.

And Now It Begins: Attack From Egypt Signals Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas Jihad Against Israel

Prof. Barry Rubin: We are now at the beginning of Egypt’s involvement, directly or indirectly, in a new wave of terrorist assault on Israel. If the Muslim Brotherhood takes over Egypt, a likelihood made less probable perhaps by the military’s dissolution of parliament, this offensive will enjoy official support. Even if the army remains in control, the Brotherhood and Salafists will use their considerable assets to back this new insurgency war.

Assad’s sectarian strategy

In fact, the killing was simply the most egregious installment in a pattern of deliberate sectarian killings (most recently in the town of al-Qubayr yesterday), the product of cold deliberation by Assad. The Syrian dictator is seeking to irredeemably tie the fate of the Alawites to his own, in a message aimed both at his sectarian community as well as at the international community.

Deutsch-emiratischer Wiederaufbau für Syrien

Neben Saudi Arabien gelten die UAE als einer der größten Förderer jihadistischer und salafitischer Bewegungen weltweit, sie waren eines der ganz wenigen Länder die das Kaliphat Afghanistan der Taliban auch diplomatisch anerkannt hatten, zu den Taliban unterhalten sie auch heute noch enge Beziehungen. In Syrien wiederum unterstützen die UAE sunnitische Islamisten, weil sie den Konflikt als einen zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, dem Golf und Iran betrachten, sind de facto also eine Bürgerkriegspartei. Vor jedem Wandel in der arabischen Welt haben sie, wie Saudi Arabien auch, panische Angst und unterdrücken zu Hause noch die kleinste dissidente Regung. Ein Syrien, dass nach Assad sich in irgend einer Weise demokratisieren würde, wäre ihnen ein Graus.

Juni 2012: Dan Schueftan in Frankfurt, Delmenhorst, Hannover, Düsseldorf, Aachen, Bonn und Leipzig

The real ‘spring’ is not Arab

Say what you will about the Arab Spring. But so far, the most remarkable and potentially disruptive developments of 18 months of uprisings is the return of ethnic, tribal and religious identities to the political stage as a challenge to the notion of a uniform Arab world. The truth is that the Arab world is an artificial concoction, the illegitimate child of the incestuous union between European colonialism and Arab nationalism. The demise of the Arab state is not assured; even when it comes, it could be every bit as bloody and messy as ethnic conflicts in the post-communist order of the Balkans and the Caucasus. But the Arab Spring offers a promise: freedom for the non-Arab ethnic groups and the non-Muslim religious minorities of the Middle East. It is a promise the West should embrace. For replacing an unjust order with one that continues to disregard minorities and their rights is never going to bring stability, peace and prosperity to those lands.

Where did the PA’s money go?

There is nothing more distasteful than rulers of a people – especially a poor people – who complain about their subjects’ suffering at the same time that they profit from it. Of course, when some foreign observer sees Palestinians in poor conditions they blame Israel, thus furthering the cause of the same leaders who, by their intransigent policies, ensure that the situation continues. The personal wealth of PA “president” Mahmoud Abbas is estimated at $100 million. Add onto that millions of dollars for a large number of PA and Fatah senior officials and you get the idea.